Equality, Misconduct and the Boundaries of Judicial Review: R (Watson) v. Police Appeals Tribunal EWHC 2214 (Admin)

The recent decision of the High Court in R (Watson) v. Police Appeals Tribunal & Chief Constable of Leicestershire Police EWHC 2214 (Admin) provides important guidance on how claims under the Equality Act 2010 interact with disciplinary proceedings within the police service. While the judgment arises from a deeply personal and contested disciplinary case involving issues of gender identity and online speech, its reasoning underscores the limits of Equality Act arguments in the context of professional misconduct.


Background to the Case

Lynsay Watson, a trans woman and serving police constable with Leicestershire Police, was dismissed for gross misconduct in October 2023. The misconduct related to a prolonged pattern of abusive and defamatory tweets directed against a former officer and his gender-critical group. Despite being warned to moderate her online activity and avoid identifying herself as a police officer, Watson continued to post prolifically under different pseudonyms, often using derogatory and inflammatory language.

At the misconduct hearing, Chief Constable Kate Meynell concluded that Watson’s conduct was deliberate, sustained, dishonest, and damaging to public confidence in the force. She was dismissed without notice.

Watson appealed to the Police Appeals Tribunal (PAT) on multiple grounds, including bias, procedural unfairness, and exclusion of fresh evidence. The PAT dismissed the appeal under rule 15 of the Police Appeals Tribunal Rules 2020, finding no real prospect of success.

She then sought judicial review of the PAT’s decision, raising wide-ranging grounds including breach of the Equality Act 2010 and institutional bias against her as a trans woman. Permission for review was refused on the papers, and a renewed application came before Mr Justice Pepperall in May 2025. The High Court has now dismissed that application in its judgment handed down on 22 August 2025.


The Equality Act Argument

Watson argued that she had been subjected to institutional discrimination because of her identity as a trans woman and that the disciplinary process failed to give due regard to the public sector equality duty (PSED) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.

She relied on a broader narrative: that while she was off work following an eye injury, she had become the target of a gender-critical online campaign, which took a toll on her mental health. She alleged that Leicestershire Police failed to support her during this period, ignored her complaints of harassment, and ultimately pursued her for misconduct in a way that was tainted by bias against her transgender status.

The Equality Act arguments therefore cut to a wider question: to what extent should discrimination considerations mitigate or excuse conduct in police disciplinary cases?


The Court’s Response

Mr Justice Pepperall rejected the Equality Act grounds for three main reasons:

  1. The case was about conduct, not beliefs.
    • The disciplinary proceedings focused narrowly on Watson’s tweets and online behaviour, not upon her gender identity or the wider gender-critical vs. trans rights debate. The Chief Constable had handled the matter appropriately by refusing to become embroiled in politically or culturally charged arguments, focusing on whether the tweets breached professional standards.
  2. No evidence of discriminatory treatment.
    • The Court found no arguable basis for suggesting that Watson was treated less favourably because she was a trans woman. On the contrary, the dismissal was explained entirely by her deliberate and repeated misconduct.
  3. The PSED was not breached.
    • Section 149 obliges public authorities to have due regard to eliminating discrimination and advancing equality. However, applying this duty does not mean excusing or overlooking misconduct. The Judge held that nothing in the dismissal decision suggested a breach of the duty, since the sanction was imposed for legitimate reasons relating to professionalism and public confidence.

Importantly, while the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) had separately ordered Lincolnshire Police to reinvestigate Watson’s harassment complaint (after partially upholding her concerns), this did not undermine the disciplinary decision taken by Leicestershire Police. The misconduct proceedings stood on independent grounds.


Broader Significance

The judgment highlights some key themes for future disciplinary and judicial review cases:

  • Equality duties apply, but do not shield misconduct.
    The Equality Act and PSED ensure that protected characteristics are considered in the exercise of public functions. However, where an officer has been found guilty of deliberate, sustained and damaging misconduct, the employer is entitled to impose dismissal if it lies within the reasonable range of responses. The duty is about process, not immunity.
  • Careful separation of issues is essential.
    The Court emphasised the need to distinguish between (a) Watson’s complaints of being harassed by gender-critical activists and (b) her own abusive online conduct as a serving officer. The linkage between the two contexts was not sufficient to taint the disciplinary decision with discrimination.
  • Equality Act arguments must be substantiated.
    Generalised claims of “institutional bias” or discrimination will rarely succeed unless supported by concrete evidence. Allegations that decision-makers shared certain associations or memberships (such as professional bodies) are insufficient without showing a real risk of actual bias.

Conclusion

Watson is a reminder that while public sector employers, including the police, must always act with fairness and with regard to equality duties, disciplinary findings will not be overturned simply because the officer belongs to a protected group or raises a general case of discrimination. The question is whether the misconduct finding and sanction were themselves tainted by unlawful discrimination or fell outside the reasonable range of outcomes.

For practitioners and those preparing for judicial service exams, the case reinforces the limited but important space that the Equality Act occupies in misconduct litigation. It is neither a shield against accountability nor a shortcut to setting aside disciplinary outcomes. Instead, it requires careful and evidence-based analysis of whether protected characteristics influenced the treatment decision.

In Watson, the High Court made clear: misconduct must still be confronted, and equality law cannot be misapplied to dilute that essential principle.

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