Hartog v. Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566, King’s Bench Division

Hartog v. Colin & Shields [1939] 3 All ER 566, King’s Bench Division

Case Summary

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had agreed to sell him 30,000 Argentine hare skins and that, in breach of contract, the defendants had failed to deliver them. He accordingly brought an action for damages against the defendants. The defendants denied that any binding contract had been entered into. They maintained that they had made a mistake in offering to sell the hare skins at a price per pound when they had intended to sell the skins at a price per piece (the value of a piece being approximately one third of the value of a pound). Further, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff was well aware of the mistake and had ‘fraudulently’ accepted an offer which ‘he well knew that the defendants had never intended to make’.

It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages from the defendants on the ground that he must have known that the defendants’ offer contained a material mistake. Singleton J In this case, the plaintiff, a Belgian subject, claims damages against the defendants because he says they broke a contract into which they entered with him for the sale of Argentine hare skins. The defendants’ answer to that claim is: ‘There really was no contract, because you knew that the document which went forward to you, in the form of an offer, contained a material mistake. You realised that, and you sought to take advantage of it.’

Counsel for the defendants took upon himself the onus of satisfying me that the plaintiff knew that there was a mistake and sought to take advantage of that mistake. In other words, realising that there was a mistake, the plaintiff did that which James LJ, in Tamplin v. James (1880) 15 Ch D 215, 211, described as ‘snapping up the offer’. It is important, I think, to realise that in the verbal negotiations which took place in this country, and in all the discussions there had ever been, the prices of Argentine hare skins had been discussed per piece, and later, when correspondence took place, the matter was always discussed at the price per piece, and never at a price per pound. Those witnesses who were called on behalf of the plaintiff have had comparatively little experience of dealing in Argentine hare skins. Even the expert witness who was called had had very little.

One witness, Mr Caytan, I think, had had no dealings in them for some years, though before that he had had some, no doubt. On the whole, I think that the evidence of Mr Wilcox, on behalf of the defendants, is the more likely to be right – namely, that the way in which Argentine hare skins are bought and sold is generally per piece. That is shown by the discussions which took place between the parties in this country, and by the correspondence. Then on 23 November came the offer upon which the plaintiff relies. It was an offer of 10,000 Argentine hares, winters (100 skins equalling 16 kilos), at 10d per lb; 10,000 half hares at 6d per lb; 10,000 summer hares at 5d per lb. Those prices correspond, roughly, in the case of the winter hares, to 3d per piece, half hares 2d per piece, and summer hares 1d per piece. The last offer prior to this, in which prices were mentioned, was on 3 November from the defendants, and the price then quoted for winter hares was 10d per piece.

Even allowing that the market was bound to fall a little, I find it difficult to believe that anyone could receive an offer for a large quantity of Argentine hares at a price so low as 3d per piece without having the gravest doubts of it. . . . I cannot help thinking that, when this quotation in pence per pound reached Mr Hartog, the plaintiff, he must have realised, and that Mr Caytan, too, must have realised, that there was a mistake. Otherwise I cannot understand the quotation. There was an absolute difference from anything which had gone before – a difference in the manner of quotation, in that the skins are offered per pound instead of per piece. I am satisfied that it was a mistake on the part of the defendants or their servants which caused the offer to go forward in that way, and I am satisfied that anyone with any knowledge of the trade must have realised that there was a mistake. I find it difficult to understand why, when Mr Caytan bought in this way at 11d per lb, he could not tell me what the total purchase price was, and I cannot help thinking that there was an arrangement of some sort, amounting rather to a division of the spoil. That is the view I formed, having heard the witnesses. I do not form it lightly. I have seen the witnesses and heard them, and in this case can form no other view than that there was an accident. The offer was wrongly expressed, and the defendants by their evidence, and by the correspondence, have satisfied me that the plaintiff could not reasonably have supposed that that offer contained the offerers’ real intention. Indeed, I am satisfied to the contrary. That means that there must be judgment for the defendants.

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